sbi_pmu_event_get_info() computes the shared memory size as
num_events * sizeof(struct sbi_pmu_event_info) before num_events is
validated. The product can wrap, in which case the domain check runs
against a truncated size while the loop below still iterates over the
original count, that is, past the region that was checked.
Check num_events against the largest value that cannot wrap, and reject
a zero address, both before the multiplication.
Fixes: e434584216 ("lib: sbi_pmu: Implement SBI PMU event info function")
Signed-off-by: liutong <liutong@iscas.ac.cn>
Reviewed-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260910052629.3359493-3-liutong@iscas.ac.cn
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
In sbi_dbtr_read_trig(), the range check is:
if (trig_idx_base + trig_count >= hs->total_trigs)
When trig_idx_base and trig_count are both unsigned long values supplied
by S-mode, their sum can wrap past ULONG_MAX to a small value, making
the check pass. For example trig_idx_base=1, trig_count=ULONG_MAX wraps
to 0, which is less than total_trigs.
This allows the subsequent for_each_trig_entry loop to access trigger
entries far beyond the triggers[] array, corrupting M-mode heap memory
via CSR read-back writes and leaking M-mode internal state to S-mode
shared memory.
Rewrite the condition as trig_count >= total_trigs - trig_idx_base. The
subtraction is safe because the preceding check already guarantees
trig_idx_base < total_trigs.
Fixes: 97f234f15c ("lib: sbi: Introduce the SBI debug triggers extension support")
Signed-off-by: liutong <liutong@iscas.ac.cn>
Reviewed-by: Himanshu Chauhan <himanshu.chauhan@oss.qualcomm.com>
Reviewed-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260910052629.3359493-2-liutong@iscas.ac.cn
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
pmu_ctr_idx_validate() checks whether counter indices are in range
using cbase + sbi_fls(cmask) < total_ctrs. Both operands are unsigned
long, so a crafted cbase close to ULONG_MAX causes the addition to wrap
around to a small value that passes the comparison.
Once validation is bypassed, sbi_pmu_ctr_cfg_match() with the
SKIP_MATCH flag uses the overflowed index directly as an array subscript
into phs->active_events[], producing an out-of-bounds read in M-mode.
Through the firmware-event code path, the same overflowed index reaches
fw_counters_data[] and fw_counters_started, giving an attacker OOB
write-zero and OOB bit-set primitives in M-mode memory.
Fix pmu_ctr_idx_validate() by checking for unsigned overflow before the
comparison, and add a secondary bounds check on cidx_first in the
SKIP_MATCH path so that even if validation is somehow bypassed in the
future, the array access remains bounded.
Signed-off-by: liutong <liutong@iscas.ac.cn>
Reviewed-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260624035049.1753003-1-liutong@iscas.ac.cn
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>