forked from Mirrors/opensbi
		
	lib: utils/ipi: buffer overrun aclint_mswi_cold_init
The parameter checks in aclint_mswi_cold_init() don't guard against a
buffer overrun.
mswi_hartid2data is defined as an array of SBI_HARTMASK_MAX_BITS entries.
The current check allows
    mswi->hart_count = ACLINT_MSWI_MAX_HARTS
    mswi->first_hartid = SBI_HARTMASK_MAX_BITS - 1.
With these values mswi_hartid2data will be accessed at index
    SBI_HARTMASK_MAX_BITS + SBI_HARTMASK_MAX_BITS - 2.
We have to check the sum of mswi->first_hartid and mswi->hart_count.
Furthermore mswi->hart_count = 0 would not make much sense.
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1529705 ("Out-of-bounds write")
Fixes: 5a049fe1d6 ("lib: utils/ipi: Add ACLINT MSWI library")
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiang W <wxjstz@126.com>
Reviewed-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
			
			
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			@@ -75,8 +75,8 @@ int aclint_mswi_cold_init(struct aclint_mswi_data *mswi)
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	/* Sanity checks */
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	if (!mswi || (mswi->addr & (ACLINT_MSWI_ALIGN - 1)) ||
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	    (mswi->size < (mswi->hart_count * sizeof(u32))) ||
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	    (mswi->first_hartid >= SBI_HARTMASK_MAX_BITS) ||
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	    (mswi->hart_count > ACLINT_MSWI_MAX_HARTS))
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	    (mswi->first_hartid + mswi->hart_count > SBI_HARTMASK_MAX_BITS) ||
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	    (!mswi->hart_count || mswi->hart_count > ACLINT_MSWI_MAX_HARTS))
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		return SBI_EINVAL;
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	/* Update MSWI hartid table */
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