forked from Mirrors/opensbi
lib: sbi_hart: reset hstatus
hstatus.HU must be cleared, because U-mode could otherwise use the HLS/HSV instructions. This would allow U-mode to read physical memory directly if vgatp and vsatp was 0. The remaining fields don't seem like a security vulnerability now, but clearing the whole CSR is not an issue, so do that be safe. Reviewed-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@ventanamicro.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250429142549.3673976-5-rkrcmar@ventanamicro.com Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
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@@ -85,6 +85,9 @@ static void mstatus_init(struct sbi_scratch *scratch)
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#endif
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}
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if (misa_extension('H'))
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csr_write(CSR_HSTATUS, 0);
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if (sbi_hart_has_extension(scratch, SBI_HART_EXT_SMSTATEEN)) {
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mstateen_val = csr_read64(CSR_MSTATEEN0);
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mstateen_val |= SMSTATEEN_STATEN;
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